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I Introduction
Is the allocation of capital efficient in the sense that profitable sectors
obtain more capital than unprofitable sectors? While this is one of the
fundamental questions for macroeconomics, it has been attracting re-
newed interests in Japan since some economists insisted that the In-
efficient allocation of capital is one of the causes for the long-run stagna-
tion in the 1990s or the "lost decade" (e.g., Caballero, Hoshi, and
Kashyap [2003]). This paper tries to answer this question by focusing on
the role of corporate debt on investment.
In Japan, many firms have been heavily indebted since the collapse of
stock and land market in the early 1990s. Debt overhang hypothesis
posits that heavily indebted firms face difficulty in financing due to the
conflicts between existing creditors and new creditors or shareholders
(Myers [1977], Myers and Majluf [1984]). As a result, they cannot carry
out profitable projects. Many researchers found evidence for this under-
investment effect of debt (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988]).1)
* Comments to an earlier version of this paper by Masaya Sakuragawa were helpful. Valuable
research assistance was provided by Tatsuji Makino.
1) For other evidences on U. S. firms, see Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995], Whited [1992], /
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Suzuki [2000], among others, using a dataset of Japanese listed firms until
1993, .• found that inv~stment was. positively correlated with equity· (and
hence negatively cQrrelated with debt).
More recent studies point out the soft budget problems associated with
debt. According to this view, heavily indebted, unprofitable firms survive
or even expand rather than downsize owing to banks' bailout. 2) Banks are
willing to lend funds to these firms rather than to stop financing and to li-
quidate them in order to maintain their own capital ratio under capital
adequacy requirements (Hosono and Sakuragawa [2002]). Hoshi [2000]
first paid attention to the fact that the share of loans to real estate indus-
tries increased over the ··1990s when land prices continued to decline and
suggested the existence of rollover of bad loans. Sugihara and Fueda
[2002], Kobayashi et al. [2002], and Hosono and Sakuragawa [2002] all
found evidence on the banks' rollover of bad loans. However, these stu-
dies did not examine the effect of such a bank lending behavior on corpo-
rate investment. 3) It is not yet to be seen whether banks' rolling over of
bad loans actually promote overinvestment by heavily indebted firms or
just reflect the shift of financing sources from bond or stocks to bank
loans by these firms. Caballero et al. [2003] investigated the effect of
"zombie lending" (or the soft budget peoblem) on the real economy using
".among others. For the evidences on Japanese firms, see Asako et al. [1991], Hayashi and Inoue
[1991], Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein [1991], and Ogawa et aI., [1994]. Note, however, that
Gomes [2001] points out that the cash-flow-augmented q-type investment regressions that many
preceding studies employed are not suitable ways to examine the effects of external fund on in-
vestment.
2) Dewatripont and Maskin [1995] provide a theoretical foundation explaining the bank's soft
budget behavior.
3) Hanazaki and Thuy [2002] estimated investment function using FSSC data for manufacturing
and non-manufacturing. But they did not adjust the data to keep consistency across years or
construct capital stock data. In addition, they did not estimate an investment function by major
non-manufacturing industries.
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data of listed firms.
This paper aims at investigating the validity of the debt overhang and
soft budget hypotheses using time series data by industry and firm size. 4)
Aggregate time-series data is not suitable to this purpose. Given that
leverage ratios vary to a large extent across industries and firm sizes, debt
overhang may be found in some industries or sizes while soft budget may
be found in other sectors. It might be possible that excess flow of funds
to some sectors due to soft budget problems reduce·· the availability of
funds and thus cause debt overhang problems in other sectors. Though
individual firm data have rich information on investment and leverage, the
availability of individual unlisted firms' data are very limited in Japan. 5J
Using only listed firms' data might cause a serious bias if small firms are
more susceptible to information problems and hence to debt overhang
problems. In addition, large firms might be more susceptible to soft
budget problems if their effect on banks' balance sheet is large. To avoid
such a sample bias, we utilize the time-series data by industry and firm
size from Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry
(FSSC). This data covers small, medium- sized, and large non-financial
firms that belong to manufacturing or non-manufacturing industries. Data
of three major non-manufacturing industries, i.e., construction, commerce
and real estate industries are also available.
The remainder of the paper is composed of five sections. In Sections 2,
we present a simple model in which debt overhang and a soft budget con-
straint problem coexist. Section 3 describes the estimation framework
-----------~-
4) Lizal and Svejnar [2002] try to find the evidence of the soft budget constraint on the invest-
ment behavior by Czech firms.
5) Recently, Fukuda et a!., [2005], Ogawa [2005], and Rosano and Masuda [2005] used datasets
for non-listed firms and examine the effects of firm net worth and bank health on investment.
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and data. Section 4 reports the estimation results of investment function.
Section 6 concludes with some policy implications.
II A Simple Model of Debt Overhang and a Soft Budget Constraint
In this section, we present a simple model in which debt overhang and
a soft budget constraint can coexist in equilibrium. Suppose that there
are two firms, G and B. Firm G (the good borrower) has an investment
opportunity that costs one and returns R> 1. Firm B (the bad borrower)
has an investment opportunity that costs one and returns zero. Firm G
and firm B have an initial debt of Dc and DB, respectively. There is one
potential lender, who has an initial claim of (XcDc and (XBDB to firms G
and B, respectively. The lender has two units of resources that she can
lend to firm G or firm B or both. The lender can also access to a safe
asset whose net return rate is zero.
In the following analysis, we make two critical assumptions. The first
assumption is that the lender incurs a cost if a borrower defaults. There
are several sorts of default costs. First, the lender may incur some
verification costs in the face of borrower default. Second, under capital
adequacy requirements, a lender bank decreases its capital ratio when a
borrower defaults. If the bank cannot meet the minimum requirement
level of capital, the default triggers a regulatory intervention that con-
strains bank business and hence imposes a regulatory cost. In addition,
the bank managers may lose their positions if the regulators displace them
due to insufficient capital. If the managers enjoy private benefit from
keeping their positions, the borrower default may deprive the bank man-
gers of the private benefit. The default cost includes all these costs. Spe-
cifically, we assume that the default cost is proportional to the amount of
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claim. We capture such a regulatory cost that is associated with firm de-
faults by b(l > b> 0). If firm G (or firm B) defaults the initial debt, the
lender incurs bacDc (or aBDB) Note that we·· implicitly assume that the
potential lender will not be punished even if she extends unrecoverable
loans to the bad borrower, reflecting the flaws of bank regulations, super-
vision, governance, and accounting standards (Rosono and Sakuragawa
[2002]).
The second critical assumption is that the potential lender cannot re-
negotiate with the old creditors. Specifically, we assume that the lender
gets all the investment returns net of the payment to the· other initial
claimants.
Under these assumptions, if the lender lends one unit to firm G, she
obtains R- (l-ac)Dc. On the other hand,if the lender does not lend to
firm G, she incurs the default cost of bacD. Similarly, the lender obtains
zero when she lends one unit to firm B and incurs the default cost of
baBDB when she does not lend to firm B. The following propositions are
straightforward.
Proposition 1 (Soft budget): Suppose that
1DB>--baB
Then, the lender lends to firm B.
Proposition 2 (Debt overhang): Suppose that
Dc> . R-l
l-(l+b)ac
Then, the lender does not lend to firm G.
( 1 )
( 2 )
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Proof
The lender has four options. First, if she lends one unit to firm G
and the other one unit to firmB, she obtains 1rCB R (1 adDG.
Second, if she lends one unit to firm G and the other one unit to the
safe asset, then she obtains 1rco == R -- (1 ad Dc baBDB+1, where the
second term is the cost from firm B's default. Third, if she lends one
unit to firm B and the other one unit to the safe asset, then, she obtains
1rOB == 1- bacDc, where the second term is the cost from firm G's de-
fault. Finally, if she invests two units to the safe asset, she obtains 1r00
bacDc- baBDB.
From these four returns, we see· that 1rGB -JrCO = 1rOB - 1r00 = baBDB-1.
Therefore, if baBDB -1 >0, then the lender lends to firm B (Proposition
1). Furthermore, we see that 1rCB -1rOB = 1rCO -1r00 = R - (1 - ac) Dc - (l
- bacDc) Therefore, if R (1- ac)Dc - (1- baGDG) <0, then the len-
derdoes not lend to firm G (Proposition 2). QED.
The inequality (1) is more likely to hold when aB, b and DB are lar-
ger. If the lender has a larger proportion of the initial claim to the bad
borrower, if she incurs a higher default cost, or if the initial debt is larger,
then she is more likely to bailout the bad borrower to avoid the default of
the bad borrower. Under the capital adequacy requirement, a poorly-
capitalized bank that incurs a high regulatory cost when a borrower de-
faults should tend to bailout a bad borrower
On the other hand, the inequality (2) is more likely to hold when ac,
band R are smaller and DG is larger. If she has a smaller proportion of
the existing debt and the borrower's debt is larger, then a larger propor-
tion of the investment return goes to the other initial claimants. Conse-
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quently, if the default cost is smaller, and.ifthe return to investment is
also smaller, she is less likely to lend to the good borrower.
A larger default cost, b, is more likely to result in the soft budget prob-
lem and less likely to lead to the debt overhang problem. More impor'"
tantly, the inequalities (1) and (2) suggest that the underinvestment of
profitable firms (debt overhang) and the. overinvestment of.unprofitable
firms (soft budget) exist at the same time when both types of firms are
highly indebted.
III The Estimation Framework
1 Specification
If the credit market is perfect and the firm maximizes the net present
value of profits, then the basic neoclassical model holds in which invest-
ment is a function of the expected net present value of marginal produc-
tivity of capital and the cost of capital. If adjustment costs of capital ex-
ist, then the lagged investment also affects the current investment. In this
case, debt does not matter.
If, on the other hand, the credit market is imperfect, then a firm's debt
outstanding can lead to either underinvestment (debt overhang) or overin-
vestment (soft budget).
Given these opposing hypotheses, we estimate the following equation
using OLS. by industry and by size.
~~l =!3o+!31PROFt+!32RRt+!33DEBTt-1
+!34LANDt-1+!35 KIt -1 +Ct
t-2
( 3 )
, where It is real investment, Kt-1is real capital stock at the end of period
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t-1, PROF/is operating profits as a proportion of nominal capital stocks,
RRt is real discount rate, DEBTt- 1 is interest-bearing debt outstanding as
a proportion of total assets, LANDt - 1 is market-valued land stocks as a
proportion of nominal capital stocks. The coefficient of PROFt is sup-
posed to be positive if frictionless credit markets exist or the debt-over-
hang hypothesis holds, while it may be insignificant or negative if the soft
budget hypothesis holds. 6) The coefficient on RRt is supposed to be nega-
tive under the perfect credit market or the debt-overhang hypothesis,
while it may be insignificant or even positive (in the case of interest re-
duction) under the soft budget hypothesis. The coefficient of DEBTt- 1 is
negative if debt overhang hypothesis is valid, while it is insignificant or
even positive if the soft budget hypothesis is relevant. The coefficient of
LANDt - 1 is supposed to be positive if land assets serve as collateral and
loosen the credit constraint that firms face.?)
2 'Data
Our main data source is the quarterly data from Financial Statements
Statistics of Corporations by Industry (FSSC) published by Ministry of Fi-
nance. The sample period begins in 1980 : 3 and ends in 2005 : 1. FSSC
sample covers non-financial corporations with equity 10 million yens and
more. Because FSSC samples 'are different for each fiscal year, we cor-
rected the original data to keep consistency over time, following Institute
for Social Engineering, Inc. [1976] and Ogawa et al. [1994]. We also
follow Ogawa et al. [1994] to construct capital stocks, investment, and
6) Lizal and Svejnar [2002] identify the soft budget constraints if the coefficient of profit is insig-
nificant or negative.
7) See Ogawa et al. [1994] for the role of land as collateral for Japanese borrowers.
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land stocks data. See the data appendix for details. All the data are sea-
sonally adjusted by Census X12.
We divide the sample period into the two sub-periods: the so-called
bubble period from 1980.: 3 to 1990.: 4 when land prices showed an in-
creasing trend and the post-bubble period from 1991 : 1 to 2005 : 1 when
land prices displayed a declining trend. We divide the sample firms by in-
dustry. and equity size. Firms are classified by three equity size
categories: small firms with equity less than ·100 million yens, middle-
sized firms with equity of 100 million yens and more but less than 1 billion
yens, and large firms with equity of 1 billion yens and more. Firms are
also divided into manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Data
for construction, commerce, and real estate industries are available among
non-manufacturing industries, though data by equity size is not available
for these three non-manufacturing industries.
Table 1 shows descriptive sample statistics by industry and size for the
bubble and the post-bubble periods. Comparing manufacturing firms with
non-manufacturing firms after controlling for firm equity size (Table 1A),
we see that manufacturing firms are characterized by relatively high oper-
ational profits as a proportion of total assets (ROA) and low interest bear-
ing debt outstanding as a proportion of total assets (DEBT) both during
the bubble and post-bubble periods. Comparing construction, commerce
and real estate industries with manufacturing industries (Table 1B), ROA
is lower for these industries than manufacturing firms during both the
bubble and post-bubble periods and DEBT is higher than manufacturing
firms during the post-bubble period.
Figures 1A and 1B depict the investment ratio (It/K t- 1) for manufactur-
ing and non-manufacturing industries, respectively. Manufacturing industries
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
1980: 3-1990 : 4
Mnfe. Mnfe. Mnfe. Non-Mnte. Non-Mnfe. Non-Mnfe.
ISmaIl /Middle ILarge ISmaIl IMiddle ILarge
lIK(-l) 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.042
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006)
PROF 0.056 0.042 0.041 0.050 0.033 0.035
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003)
RR 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.011
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DEBT 0.385 0.348 0.328 0.446 0.471 0.491
(0.030) (0.013) (0.024) (0.044) (0.029) (0.022)
LAND 1.210 0.928 0.648 1.990 1.405 0.589
(0.440) (0.298) (0.221) (0.662) (0.450) (0.177)
ROA 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.012
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CF 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.014 0.012 0.016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
1991 : 1-2005 : 1
Mnfe. Mnfe. Mnfe. Non-Mnfe. Non-Mnfe. Non-Mnfe.
ISmaIl IMiddle ILarge ISmaIl IMiddle ILarge
lIK(-1) 0.026 0.025 0.028 0.030 0.030 0.034
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012)
PROF 0.028 0.021 0.024 0.030 0.018 0.020
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
RR 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DEBT 0.438 0.346 0.267 0.510 0.480 0.466
(0.020) (0.031) (0.027) (0.021) (0.044) (0.038)
LAND 0.859 0.635 0.429 1.240 0.895 0.350
(0.359) (0.263) (0.189) (0.581) (0.428) (0.175)
ROA 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
CF 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.010 0.012 0.016
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
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1980: 3-1990 : 4 1991 : 1-2005 : 1
Con- Manu- Real Com- Con- Manu- Real Com-
struction facturing estate merce struction facturing estate merce
lIK(-1) 0.043 0.039 0.032 0.036 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.029
(0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.006) (Q.013) (0.006) (0,01(j) (0.007)
PROF 0.102 0.045 0.045 0.070 0.065 0.024 0.025 0.038
(0.024) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.034) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
RR 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.009
(O.QO~) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
DEBT 0.313 0.345 0.668 0.381 0.330 0.320 0.728 0.405
(0.020) (0.012) (0.053) (0.027) (0.012) (0.024) (0.049) (0.023)
LAND 2.171 0.811 2.594 2.324 1.347 0.545 1.546 1.420
(0.791) (0.279) (0.975) (0.796) (0.630) (0.239) (0.790) (0.713)
ROA 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
CF 0.013 0.022 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.005 0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
2. For small firms, the sample period ends in 2004 : 1.
displayed a large increase in the investment ratio during the latter half of
the 1980s, followed by a decrease in the first half of the 1990s. Non-
manufacturing industries also displayed a similar trend with a particularly
large swing for large firms. In 1998 and 1999, when the banking crisis cul-
minated, the investment ratios decreased both for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing industries. In 2003 and 2004, the investment ratios display-
ed an increasing trend except
firms.
middle-sized .. non-manufacturing
Figures 2A 2B depict the return to capital stock (PROFt). The
trends of the return to capital stock are by and large similar to the trends
of the investment ratio with the exception of small non-manufacturing
firms that did not show a clear increasing trend in PROFt for the latter










Figure lB. Investment ratio for non-manufacturing industries
0.12,-------------------------------,
-<- Small
0.1 f·····-_··············································._.-;. _ __ __ .. __ _ , -0- Medium
--.l-- Large
0.08 f·············_················_·····_·············_········-··H·_······-·········_·····_······················_······················_····1
Debt Overhang, Soft Budget, and Corporate Investment











Figure 2B. Return to capital for non-manufacturing industries
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half of the 1980s.
Figures 3A and 3B depict the debt-to-asset ratio (DEBTt ) for manufac-
turing and non-manufacturing industries, respectively. It is notable that
the average debt-to-asset ratios for non-manufacturing firms are higher
than manufacturing firms. Large manufacturing firms displayed a declin-
ing trend of the debt-to-asset ratio throughout the sample period. In con-
trast, small non~manufacturing firms displayed an increasing trend until
1991, and did not show a decreasing trend until 2002. These differences
in investment, profitability and indebtedness across the industries and firm
sizes motivate us to estimate the investment function for each sector.
IV Empirical Analyses
1 Estimation Results for Investment by Industry and Size
Table 2 shows the estimation results of the investment function (Eq. 3)
by industry and size.
Looking at the results for the 1981 : 3-1990: 4 period (Table 2A), we
see that the coefficients of PROFt are positive for all the sectors and sig-
nificant for medium-sized and large manufacturing firms. The coefficients
of RRt are negative except for medium-sized and large non-manufacturing
firms and significantly negative for medium-sized manufacturing firms.
The coefficients of DEBTt - 1 are significantly negative for small and
medium-sized manufacturing firms, while they are significantly positive for
large non-manufacturing firms and insignificant for the other sectors.
Large -non-manufacturing firms could increase investment while accumu-
lating debt in the 1980s. The coefficients of LANDt - 1 are signifidmtly
positive for small manufacturing firms and small non-manufacturing firms,
while they are insignificant for the other sectors. Increasing land prices
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Table 2. Investment by industry and size. Dependent variable: I/K(t-1)
A. Sample period: 1980: 4-1990 : 4
Industry Manu- Manu- Manu- Non-manu- Non-manu- Non-manu-facturing facturing facturing facturing facturing facturing
Size Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Constant 0.046** 0.056** 0.023 0.001 0.039* -0.064
(0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.040)
PROF 0.032 0.215** 0.141 ** 0.146 0.364 0.500
(0.122) (0.093) (0.049) (0.232) (0.239) (0.458)
RR -0.446 -0.347** -0.005 -'0.054 0.141 0.220
(0.328) (0.144) (0.245) (0.344) (0.247) (0.425)
DEBT(t-1) -0.050** -0.099** -0.041 0.035 -0.014 0.153**
(0.021) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.040) (0.069)
LAND(t-1) 0.004** 0.001 -0.001 0.010** -0.003 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
I(t-l)1K(t-2) 0.279* 0.319** 0.632** -0.116 -0.025 0.192
(0.156) (0.150) (0.093) (0.166) (0.125) (0.197)
Adjusted R-squared 0.381 0.700 0.528 0.663 0.137 0.384
Durbin-Watson stat 2.099 2.244 2.533 2.011 1.953 1.954
B. Sample period: 1991 : 1-2005 : 1
Industry Manu- Manu- Manu- Non-manu- Non-manu- Non-manu-facturing facturing facturing facturing facturing facturing
Size Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Constant 0.045** 0.041 ** 0.020** -0.017 -0.009 0.006
(0.015) (0.017) (0.007) (0.050) (0.012) (0,016)
PROF 0.129 0.003 0.043 0.238 0.467* 0.287
(0.085) (0.153) (0.052) (0.179) (0.254) (0.312)
RR -0.612* -0.617** -0.329** -0.049 -0.556** -0.365
(0.306) (0.168) (0.157) (0.676) (0.218) (0.308)
DEBT(t-1) -0.071** -0.070* -0.030 0.050 0.049* 0.042
(0.030) (0.040) (0.021) (0.090) (0.025) (0.032)
LAND(t-1) 0.016** 0.023** 0.022** 0.006* 0.002 0.020**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010)
I(t-1 )/K(t-2) 0.008 -0.013 0.307* 0.222* 0.320** -0.073**
(0.106) (0.121) (0.156) (0.126) (0.168) (0.023)
Adjusted R-squared 0.801 0.759 0.903 0.566 0.687 0.926
Durbin-Watson stat 1.733 1.918 2.163 1.964 2.092 1.813
Notes 1. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
**,* Significant at 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Debt Overhang, Soft Budget, and Corporate Investment (317) 41
stimulated investment for small firms during the 1980s.
Turning to the estimation results for the 1991 : 1-2005 : 1 period (Table
2B), we see that the coefficients of PROFt are positive for all the sectors
and significant for medium-sized non-manufacturing firms. The coef-
ficients of RRt are negative for all the sectors and significant except for
small and large non-manufacturing firms. The coefficients of DEBTt - 1 are
significantly negative for the small and medium-sized manufacturing firms
while they are significantly positive for medium-sized non"'manufacturing
firms and insignificant for the other sectors. The coefficients of LANDt- 1
are significantly positive for all the industries except for medium-sized
non-manufacturing firms. Medium-sized non-manufacturing industries
could continue to expand investment by accumulating debt despite their
high debt-to-assetratios and declining land prices after the bubble had
collapsed in the early 1990s.
In sum, debt restrained small and medium-sized manufacturing firms
both in the bubble period and post-bubble period, while debt did not res-
train non-manufacturing firms irrespective of the size and period. Rather,
debt promoted investment by large non-manufacturing firms during the
1980s and medium-sized non-manufacturing firms during the 1990s and
early 2000s. Considering that ROA was lower for non-manufacturing
firms than for manufacturing firms, the results for small and medium-sized
manufacturing firms over the 1991 : 1-2005 : 1 period are consistent with
the debt overhang hypothesis and the results for medium-sized non-manu-
facturingfirms over the 1991 : 1-2005 period are consistent with the soft
budget· hypothesis.
42 (318) ~ 176~ ~3~
2 Estimates Results for Investment by Industry
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the investment function (Eq. 3)
for construction, commerce, real estate and manufacturing industries.
Looking at the estimates for the 1981 : 3-1991: 1 period (Table3A), we
see that the coefficients of PROFt are positive except for the real estate
industry and significantly positive for the manufacturing· and commerce in-
dustries. The coefficients of RR t are negative except for the real estate
industry but not significant for any industry. The coefficients of DEBTt - 1
are significantly negative for the manufacturing and construction industries
but insignificant for the commerce and real estate industries. Turning to
the coefficients of LANDt-l, we see that they are significantly positive for
the construction and commerce industries, insignificant for the real estate
industries, and significantly negative for the manufacturing industry.
While the positive coefficients of LANDt- 1 are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that land assets can serve as collateral and hence loosen the credit
constraint, the negative coefficient of LANDt- 1 for the manufacturing in-
dustry suggest that investment by manufacturing firms might have been
crowded out by the construction and commerce industries when land
prices increased.
For the 1991 : 2-2005 : 1 period estimates (Table 3B), the coefficients of
PROFt are positive except for the real estate industry and significantly
positive for the manufacturing and construction industries. The coef-
ficientsof RRt are negative except for the real estate industry and signi-
ficantly negative for the manufacturing industry. The coefficients of
DEBTt - 1 are negative except for the commerce industry and significantly
negative for the real estate industry. The coefficients of LANDt- 1 are sig-
nificantly positive for the manufacturing, commerce, and real estate industries
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Table 3. Investment by industry. Dependent variable: I/K(t-l)
A. Sample period: 1980: 4-1990 : 4
Industry Manufacturing Construction Commerce Real estate
Constant 0.097** 0.083** 0.019 -0.016
(0.017) (0.028) (0.017) (0.044)
PROF 0.166** 0.083 0.136** -0.148
(0.041) (0.089) (0.050) (0.300)
RR -0.051 -0.066 -0.444 0.799
(0.143) (0.271) (0.300) (0.834)
DEBT(t-l) -0.199** -0.205** -0.025 0.045
(0.038) (0.088) (0.043) (0.085)
LAND(t-1) -0.005** 0.008* 0.004** 0.008
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
I(t-l )lK(t-2) 0.210* 0.010 0.375** -0.120
(0.112) (0.139) (0.122) (0.096)
Adjusted R-squared 0.760 0.606 0.779 0.221
Durbin-Watson stat 2.252 1.949 2.012 2.035
B. Sample period: 1991 : 1-2005 : 1
Industry Manufacturing Construction Commerce Real estate
Constant 0.019** 0.014 0.006 0.058**
(0.007) (0.017) (0.021) (0.028)
PROF 0.112** 0.180** 0.092 -0.383
(0.045) (0.076) (0.105) (0.373)
RR -0.415** -0.400 -0.400 0.821
(0.149) (0.289) (0.324) (1.058)
DEBT(t-l) -0.025 -0.021 0.021 -0.071*
(0.016) (0.048) (0.044) (0.039)
LAND(t-l) 0.017** 0.002 0.006* 0.015**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
I(t-l )/K(t-2) 0.273** 0.398** 0.225 -0.008
(0.129) (0.139) (0.171) (0.123)
Adjusted R-squared 0.916 0.883 0.755 0.342
Durbin-Watson stat 2.154 2.282 1.935 2.021
Notes: 1. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
**, * Significant at 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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but insignificant for the construction industry.
In sum, the estimation results by industry are somewhat mixed. We
may conclude that the manufacturing industry has been subject to the
debt.overhang problem during the bubble and post-bubble periods, judg-
ing from the positive coefficients of PROFt and the negative coefficients
of DEBTt - I , though the coefficient of DEBTt - I is not significant for the
post-bubble period?) On the other hand, it may be difficult to determine
only from the estimation results. by industry whether the debt-overhang
hypothesis or the soft budget hypothesis has been valid to the construc-
tion, commerce and real estate industries. It should be important to clas-
sify firms by size as well as industry when we investigate the effects of
debt on investment, as Table 2 actually suggests.
V Conclusions
How does corporate debt affect the allocation of capital? To answer
this question, we first theoretically show that debt can constrain invest-
ment by profitable firms (debt overhang) and at the same time promote
investment by unprofitable firms (soft budget). Then we conduct empiric-
al analyses using the time series data of Japanese firms by industry and
size over the 1980: 3-1990 : 1 and 1991 : 1-2005 : 1 periods. Our estima-
tion results for investment by firm size and industry over the
1991 : 1-2005 : 1 period, in particular, suggest that the debt overhang
hypothesis was valid to the small and medium-sized manufacturing firms
that were characterized by relatively high ROA and low debt ratios while
the soft budget hypothesis was valid to the medium-sized, non-manufacturing
8) We restrict our sample to the 1991: 1-1999: 1 period to estimate Eq. 3, obtaining the results
that the coefficient of DEETH is significantly negative for the manufacturing industry.
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firms that were characterized by· a relatively low ... ROA and high debt
ratios. Our results suggest that corporate debt distorted the allocation of
capital in Japan for more than the last two decades.
One of the most important factors that .linked .debt. and misallocation of
capital is the flaw of the Japanese· financial system.•. Debt overhang would
not occur if renegotiations between new and old creditors were possible.
Soft budget constraint problems would not emerge if creditors were well
disciplined so that they did not extend unrecoverable loans to unprofitable
firms. Considering that those firms. that were severely affected by debt
were small and medium-sized firms, the weakness of the banking system,
rather than the capital market, in Japan seem to account for the debt
overhang and soft budget problems. Restoring bank health and high-
quality regulation~ and governance to banks would help resolve the .prob-
lems of capital misallocation.
Data Appendix
1. Time series data of balance sheet variables
Data source is Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry (FSSC)
by Ministry of Finance. Because samples are changed in every first quarter of
fiscal year and fixed during the following three quarters, we correct the effects of
sample changes to keep consistency of time series data, following Institute for So-
cial Engineering, Inc. [1976] and Ogawa et al. [1994]. Assuming that balance
sheet variables grow at the same rate between those firms that newly enter the
samples and those that have been in the samples since the previous fiscal year, all




where At* is total assets of the first quarter samples of fiscal year t as of the previous
quarter (i.e. as of the fourth quarter of fiscal year), At-I, 4 is total assets of the
fourth quarter samples of fiscal year t-1 as of the fourth quarter of fiscal year t-1,
Nt-I, i is the number of sample corporations as of the i th quarter of fiscal year t-1.
Samples of firms with equity less than 100 million yen until 1989 : 1 are chosen
from the lists as of January of year t-1 and fixed throughout the fiscal year t. Fol-
lowing Institute for Social Engineering, Inc. [1976] and Ogawa et al. [1994] to
correct for this sample selection lag for the small-sized firms, we multiply all the
balance sheet variables as of the i th quarter of fiscal year [-1 by Nt-I. 1 before we
make adjustment of (Al). Samples of firms with equity less than 100 million yens
after 1989 : 2 are chosen from the lists as of October of year [-1 and fixed through-
out the fiscal year t. Therefore, we multiply all the balance sheet variables as of
the i th quarter of fiscal year t-1 by (::~'I,i i-I) /2+ 1 before we make adjust-
ment of (Al).
2. Capital stocks
We construct capital stock data based on the perpetual inventory method, fol-
lowing Ogawa et al. [1994].
First, we deflate "other tangible fixed assets" as of the first quarter of FY 1980
by "private fixed investment deflator" as of the first quarter of FY1973, considering
the average vintage of capital stocks. We derive the 7-year vintage by averaging
the vintages of each type of capital with weights from National Wealth Survey
1970, Economic Planning Agency.
Next, we derive real fixed investments by deflating "increases in other tangible
fixed assets" by "private fixed investment deflator" as of the corresponding quar-
ter.
Finally, we derive real capital stocks using the following equations :
K t = (l-o)Kt - I + It (A2)
, where Kt is the end-of-period real capital stock, ais the depreciation rate, and It
is real investment. The annual depreciation rates are borrowed from Ogawa et al.
[1994]: 0.0869, 0.0774, 0.0692, 0.0519, and 0.0771 for construction, manufacturing,
wholesale and retail, real estate industries, and non-manufacturing, respectively.
We convert these annual rates to quarter rates by dividing by 4.
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3. Land stocks
We also construct land· stocks data based on the perpetual inventory method,
following Ogawa et al. [1994].
First, we choose a bench mark at the first quarter of 1980 and convert the book
value to the market value at the bench mark. The ratio of market-to-book as of
the. benchmark is assumed. to be 3.9~. 'This.is Ogawa .et aL'sestimatesfor the
average of all industries.
Next, we derive net market-valued land investment NILANDt, based on LIFO




, where lLANDt is increase in land stocks, DLANDt is decrease in land stocks (due
to sales), and PF is land price deflator. The land price deflator is "six major urban
land price index for all purposes" by Japan Real Estate Institute.
Finally, we derive market-valued land stocks LANDYt and real land investment










Investment Ratio(t) = I/Kt - i
PROF(t) = Operating profits(t)/(Investment deflator(t-1)· Real capital stock
(t-1))
RR(t) Interests paid(t)/(Short-termborrowings(t-1) + Bills receivable dis-
counted outstanding(t-1) + Long-term borrowings(t-1) + Bonds(t-1))
Rates of change in GDP deflator from the previous year/4
DEBT(t-1) = (Short-term borrowings(t-1) + Long-term borrowings(t-1) +
Bonds(t-1))/Assets(t-1)
LAND(t-1) = Market-valued land stocks(t-1)/(Investment deflator(t-1)· Real
capital stocks(t-1))
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